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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OTHELLO HICKMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
a Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
FILED L. E. NELSON, .~ SAMUEL J. CARTER, ~ .~ ~ . Attorneys for Plaintiff 
M ct.y {~ · · ·; · and Appellant. 
_...,..,....E;;-5~~~~ ;;~;EOGuRT.UTi.ti ··-~ Cl_n"' '-d .. ~.~~~ 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for Salt Lake County. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OTHELLO HICKMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
a Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, referred to hereafter as plaintiff, sued 
respondent, who will be referred to hereafter as defendant, 
to recover damages for injuries which he sustained in an 
automobile-train accident. The trial of the cause in the 
court below resulted in a verdict and judgment in de-
fendant's favor, and plaintiff has brought this appeal to 
secure a reversal of said judgment. 
The accident occurred on October 30th, 1947, at 
about 6:45 p. m. (Tr. 139), on U. S. Highway 91, at a 
point approximately two miles southwesterly from Logan, 
Utah, where a spur track of defendant crosses said high-
way. (Tr. 187, 227). The said highway at the scene 
of the accident runs in a general northeasterly direction 
toward Logan, and the spur track crosses the highway at 
grade and at near right angles. ( Tr. 112). The highway 
is paved with concrete and is level; with two traffice lanes 
each 11 feet wide, (Tr. 112). 
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There is a railroad sign commonly referred to as cross-
bucks, on the east side of the pavement and south of the 
tracks. The defendant did not maintain any wig-wag 
flashers at said crossing, nor were any flares or other lights 
placed on the highway to warn motorists that said cross-
ing was being used. There was no light placed upon any 
of the railroad cars as they approached the crossing. ( Tr. 
192.) 
The spur track extends southeasterly; from the high-
way for about a half-mile to the main line, and it is not in 
regular use. It is used principally during the fall of the 
year to transport sugar beets from a storage pile located 
on the sugar factory site on the west side of the highway. 
At the time of the accident the defendant was pushing 
about 8 empty sugar beet cars ahead of the engine which 
was operating in reverse. 
On the date of accident, plaintiff and Melvin Squires, 
a business associate, were returning to Logan in the plain-
tiff's car. (Tr. 225, 226). As they approached a point 
on said highway about three-tenths of a mile south of the 
spur track they passed a high'Yay patrolman's car parked 
on the west side of the highway facing south. Plaintiff 
and Squires both observed the insignia on the patrolman's 
car and the plaintiff then observed his speedometer to 
ascertain if he was within the speed limit, and found the 
indicator showed that plaintiff's car was then traveling 
between 45 and 50 miles per hour. (Tr. 227, 228). 
After plaintiff's car passed the patrolman's car the 
latter turned around and proceeded northerly, following 
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about hvo-tenths of a mile behind plaintiff's car. (Tr. 153 ). 
The highway patrolman, Roland Reese, testified that the 
plaintiffs car was traveling at a normal rate of speed at 
the time it passed him and he estimated that the car was 
travelli1g between 45 and 50 miles per hour. (Tr. 154). 
The plaintiff proceeded northerly along said highway 
at the same speed until he reached a point a short distance 
south of the spur track when Squires said, 4:4:There comes 
a train on the high,vay,,, and the plaintiff immediately 
applied the brakes, and, as he testified, "As I applied my 
brakes, then I saw the car coming on to the highway. I 
had not seen the car until ~Ir. Squires yelled at me; and 
I pushed my brake with all the force I could, and I could 
see we were going to hit something." ( Tr. 228). All 
four wheels skidded for a distance of 85 feet before collid-
ing with the train. ( Tr. 166) The plaintiff's car collided 
with the first railroad car entering the highway at the 
rear of its front trucks, and before the train came to a 
complete stop the front end of plaintiff's car was pulled 
to the left and into the west lane on the highway, (See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit B.) The brakes and light on plaintiff's 
car were in good condition. 
The first car approaching from the opposite direction 
was operated by Mrs. Afton Archibald of Wellsville, and 
as she reached the bridge over Blacksmith Fork River, 
which is about 500 feet North of the spur track crossing, 
(Tr. 188) she could see someone with what she took to 
be a flashlight, waving said light up and down in front 
of him. He was standing on the west side of the pavement 
facing in her direction. She then saw the plaintiff's car 
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coming from the opposite direction. She slowed down 
but didn't stop. When she approached to within about 
40 feet of the crossing (Tr. 189) she observed the railroad 
car suddenly appear in front of her on the crossing, and 
she "slammed" on the brakes. She then heard the screech-
ing of the brakes on the plaintiff's car and immediately 
thereafter the crash. There was no light on the train, and 
just before the impact the man with the flashlight tu~ed 
and ran across to the south side of the spur track. (Tr. 190) 
She definitely heard the screeching of the brakes on plain-
tiff's car. ( Tr. 190~~) At the time of the impact the rail-
road car was not half-way across the concrete pavement, 
and it moved after the impact so that she had to drive off 
the pavement on the west side and momentarily stopped. 
( Tr. 191). Mrs. Archibald testified that she did not ob-
serve the engine, nor did she hear the engine whistle or 
the ringing of the bell. Neither did she observe any light 
on the train nor any flares or lights at any place on the 
highway. (Tr. 192). 
Officer Reese testified - .:'There were no lights, that 
it was an awful dark night, and that the moon had not 
come up." As Reese drove up to the scene of the acci-
dent, he saw no lights on the railroad car nor on the high-
way at the crossing. ( Tr. 157, 158) As he drove along 
behind plaintiff prior to the accident, and as he appr-
ached the crossing he did not hear the train whistle nor 
did he hear the bell ringing or hear any siren. (Tr. 158). 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
Comes now the plaintiff and appellant, and assigns 
the following errors upon which he relies for a reversal 
of the verdict and judgment entered thereon: 
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1. The court erred in admitting, over plaintiff's ob-
jection, defendant's Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. (1.,r. 132-134.) 
2. The court erred in denying the following motion 
made b~~ plaintiff: "~lR. CARTER: If the Court please, 
I n1ove that these photographs be stricken from the record. 
There is no showing as to when they were made, or the 
conditions under which they were taken. Conditions have 
changed. One of the witnesses testified that at the time 
of the accident the bn1sh was high. Here it shows it 
~, flat. THE COURT: The motion is denied." 
(Tr. 384 ). 
3. The court erred in giving the last portion of in-
struction No. 7, viz.; "and the railroad company's employ-
ees have a right to presume that motorists on the highway 
will drive with their cars under such control as to be able 
to stop within the distance at which they can see objects 
ahead." (Tr. 23). 
4. The court erred in giving the last sentence of 
instruction No 9, viz.; "After the cars of such a train are 
upon and occupying or passing over a highway the pres-
ence of such train or cars lawfully upon such highway is 
a sufficient warning to approaching travelers and such 
travelers on the highway are bound to see such train of 
cars on the highway in time to stop and to avoid colliding 
therewith." ( Tr. 24). 
5. The court erred in giving instruction No. 18. (Tr. 
27, 28.) 
6. The court erred in its refusal to give plaintiff's 
requested instruction No. 1. ( Tr,. 40). 
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7. The court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial. ( Tr. 99). 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
I 
The court erred (Assignment No. 1), in admitting 
over plaintiff's objection defendant's Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 
and 6. ( Tr. 132-134. ) And the court also erred, (Assign-
ment No. 2) in denying plaintiff's motion to strike said 
exhibits (Tr. 384.) These exhibits were offered and ad-
mitted in evidence ( Tr. 132-124) on the cross exami-
nation of plaintiff's witness Benny Degn, a photographer, 
who had been called by plaintiff to lay the foundation for 
the admission of plaintiff's Exhibits B. C. D., and E (Tr. 
120-123.) Plaintiff's objection to the admission of defend-
ants exhibits, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 was based upon the ground 
that no proper foundation' had been laid and that it was 
not proper cross examination. (Tr. 134). And plaintiff's 
motion to strike said exhibits ( Tr. 384) was made when 
it appeared that defendant had failed to offer any evi-
dence to show when the pictures were taken, or whether 
the conditions and circumstances were the same when said 
pictures were taken as they were when the accident oc-
curred. 
The plaintiff submits that as a matter of orderly pro-
ceedure a party should offer his evidence in his own time 
and not poach upon the rights of the party who is then 
introducing his side of the case. If a defendant may be 
permitted to offer his evidence upon the cross examination 
of plaintiff's witness, then the rule could be enlarged to 
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the point where defendant would be presenting his case 
simultaneously, and at the same time that plaintiff pre-
sents his case. 
If defendanf s Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were taken in 
the spring of 1948, then the conditions would be changed 
to the extent that they would not present the true condi-
tion that existed on the date of the accident. If the indi-
vidual \vho had taken these pictures had been produced, 
the plaintiff could have cross-examined him as to the 
time, \veather conditions, etc., and if it had been determ-
ined that the pictures were taken the following spring, 
then they would be subject to the objection that they were 
taken at a time too remote and after conditions surround-
ing the scene of the accident had changed. In order for 
a picture to have any definite value as evidence, it must 
be taken so near the time of the accident that it will re-
produce the actual condition prevailing at the time of the 
accident. 
We earnestly submit that the court committed revers-
ible error in admitting said exhibits on the showing made, 
under the following authorities and cases: 
In Goldstein~s Trial Technique, at page 328, section 
396, under the heading of admissibility, the author states 
the rule, as follows: 
"However, if the conditions between the condi-
tions at the time of the accident and the time when 
the photograph was taken is of such a nature that 
the result of the trial would probably be different if 
the conditions as they formerly existed were shown, 
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the photograph is not admissible. Where the view 
at a railroad passing was obstructed by vegetation at 
the time of the injury and the vegetation had all been 
removed at the time of the photograph, it was held 
that the photograph was not a correct representaion 
and was not admissable. (citing Althoff vs. I. C. R. 
Co., 227 Ill. 417.) 
In 30 Am. Jur. 611, Section 731, the rule is laid 
down: 
14~~~-
of the taking of a picture are subject to change, a 
photograph to be admissible, must have been taken 
at the time of the transaction or before the situation 
and corcumstances have undergone change. In many 
instances photographs have been held inadmissible 
on the ground that they were taken at a time too re-
mote and when conditions had changed." (The fol-
lo,:ving cases are cited to support the above rule.) 
Chicago etc., R. R. Co., vs. Crose, 73 N. E. 865, where 
the Supreme Court of Illinois held: 
"When the. situation and surrounding circum-
stances are subject to change, photographs, to be of 
any value as evidence, must be shown to have been 
taken at the time or when the situation and surround-
ings are unchanged." 
In Surratt vs. Robinson, ( Md. ) 135 Alt. 838, 50 A.L.R. 
280, the court said: 
"The second exception was taken to the action of 
the trial court in permitting a photograph of the place 
where the accident occurred to be offered in evi-
I rr I f([l 
· rn u 
~ u 
rr 
~ H 
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dence. As has been stated the accident occurred on 
October 15, 1925, between 8 and 9 o'clock in the 
n1orning, and the case was tried in the following 
~larch. The photograph was taken by counsel in the 
case, in the atternoon after the adjournment of court 
pending the trial. From the testimony it appeared 
that the conditions of the foliage, shrubbery, and 
lighting were different at the time of the accident 
than when the photograph was taken, and the photo-
graph itself was obscure and indefinite in its details, 
and it should not have been admitted in evidence." 
II 
The court erred (Assignment of error No. 3) in giv-
ing the following instruction to the jury, "And the rail-
road company's employees have a right to presume that 
motorists on the highway will drive with their cars under 
such control as to be able to stop within the distance at 
which they can see objects ahead." ( Instn1ction No. 7, 
Tr. 23 ). 
The court also erred in giving the following instruc-
tion ( Assigirment C?f Error No. 4) "After the cars of such 
train are upon and occupying or passing over a highway 
the presence of such train or cars lawfully upon such high-
way is a sufficient warning to approaching travelers and 
such travelers on the highway are bound to see such train 
of cars on the highway in time to stop and to avoid col-
liding therewith." (Instruction No. 9, Tr. 24). 
The foregoing instructions when read together, as-
sume that the train was on the crossing all the time while 
the plaintiff was a sufficient distance away from the cross-
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ing to have looked and stopped before colliding with the 
defendant's train. They also assume that the railroad 
cars were lawfully upon the highway. This is assuming 
the important fact that is in issue. 
Plaintiff submits that it was prejudicial error to give 
these instruction since there is no evidence in the record 
that defendant's train was occuping or passing over the 
highway before plaintiff applied his-brakes. The evidence 
of witnesses testifying for the pla~ntiff and defendant is, 
that when the plaintiff applied his brakes the first car of 
the train was then only entering upon the highway. (Tr. 
228, 189, 319). The plaintiff testified that - "Just a little 
way before we got to the track, my companion, Mr. 
Squires, yelled to me: 'There cqmes a train on the high-
way.' xxx, I immediately applied my brakes, xxx. As I ap-
plied my brakes, then I saw the car coming on to the 
highway." (Tr. 228 ). 
Mrs. Archibald testified that as she approached the 
crossing from the north, and when only about 40 feet from 
the same that - "Then it seemed like all of a sudden this 
railroad car loomed up in front of me. I slammed on my 
brakes and I heard the scheeching of the brakes on the 
plaintiff's car and the crash." (Tr. 189, 190). She further 
testified that at the time of the collision the front end of 
the railroad car was not half-way across the highway. 
(Tr. 191.) 
The defendant's witness Squires testified, (Tr. 319) 
that he observed a train of cars coming out onto the high-
way. He saw the cars in the field first, and then he 
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observed the first car entering the highway, "about eight 
feet over." .:\t that time he hollered, "There is a train," 
( Tr. 320) and Plaintiffs Exhibit "B" plainly reveals the 
fact that plaintiff's car collided with the front end of the 
railroad car in the east lane of traffic, and the ·railroad car 
then moved forward until the front end thereof reached 
the west side of the pavement, dragging the front end of 
plaintiff's car with it. These facts are plainly illustrated 
by Plaintiff's Exhibits B, C, D, and E. 
This evidence definitely shows that the tn1.in was ap-
proaching the highway when the plaintiff, Squires and 
:\Irs. Archibald first saw it. At that instant the plaintiff's 
car was too close to the crossing to stop before colliding 
with the train. (Earle v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Corp. 165 
P. 2d. 877.) 
We earnestly submit that the Court invaded the prov-
ince of the jury and also misled the1n by giving these er-
roneous instructions. 
This court has held repe~tedly that it is prejudicial 
error to give an instruction on an issue not supported by 
competent evidence. Davis v. Midvale City, 56 Utah 1, 
189 Pac. 74; Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Company 
105 P. 2d. 347; and Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co. 133 P. 
2d. 333. 
In the case of Davis v. Midvale City, supra, this court 
relied upon and quoted the general rule as laid down in 
38 Cyc. 1612, 1613, as follows: 
"It is improper to give an instruction announcing 
a naked legal proposition, however correct it may be, 
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unless it bears upon and is connected with the issues 
involved; and unless, further, there has been received 
some competent evidence to which the jury may ap-
ly it. Such an instruction tends to distract the minds 
of the jury from the real question submitted to them 
for determination, and thereby mislead them, and, if 
requested, may be proprly refused." 
The same rule is recognized and adhered to in Shields 
v. Utah Light & Traction Company, supra, where the judg-
ment of the trial court was reversed and one of the grounds 
for reversal resulted because the trial court gave an in-
struction on an element of damage which was pleaded, but 
there was no evidence adduced at the trial to support it. 
And in Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, the same 
rule is reiterated in the 8th head note which reads: 
"It is error to give instructions on a state of facts 
which there is no evidence tending to prove, or which 
undisputed evidence shows did not exist, even should 
such instructions contain correct statements of law." 
The holding of this court in the foregoing cases is 
well supported by the courts in other jurisdictions. We 
take the liberty of citing some recent cases from other 
states: 
Hancock et.al. v. Myers et.al. (Okla.) 176 P. 2d 820. 
Magnolia Petroleum v. Galloway (Okla.) 83 P. 2d. 
174. 
Tosto v. City of Seattle et. al. (Wash.) 171 P. 2d. 194. 
Lubliner v. Ruge (Wash.) 153 P. 2d. 694. 
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Garrison v. Trowbridge ( J\lont.) 177 P. 2d. 464. 
Krupp v. Los Angeles Ry. Corporation (Cal.) 135 P. 
2d. 42-!. 
Clarke v. \ 7 olpa Bros. (Cal.) 124 P. 2d. 377. 
Hyman v. J\Iarket Ry. Co. (Cal.) 107 P. 2d. 485. 
Gregg v. ~1cDonald (Cal.) 239 Pac. 373. 
In the Oklahoma case of Hancock et.al. v. Myers. 
et.al. supra, the Court held: 
"The second ground of error is well taken. No 
evidence was introdu~ed touching the rental value 
of the premises or of damage suffered by plaintiffs by 
reason of defendants' possession thereof. Such being 
true, the submission of such issue to the jury was 
" error. 
In the case of Magnoli~ Petroleum v. Galloway, supra, 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that it was prejudic-
ial error for the trial court to give an instruction to the 
jury which was not supported by the evidence and, in 
arriving at this conclusion, the Court said: 
Defendant contends that it was error for the 
court to submit to the jury instructions concerning 
gasoline which 'had not been tested' because the evi-
dence does not ·show the defendant sold 'untested' 
gasoline. An examination of the re_cord discloses that 
it is neither alleged in the pleadings nor shown by the 
evidence that the defendants sold gasoline to the 
plaintiffs which had not been tested. The above in-
structions would permit the jury to find for the plain-
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tiffs because the defendants furnished untested gaso-
line. This was error. In White v. Oliver, 32 Okl. 479, 
122 P. 156 par. 5, of the syllabus, reads: 'It is error 
to give an instruction, presenting to the jury a theory 
o fthe case, when there is no evidence to support the 
theory.' " 
In the case of Tosto v. City of Seattle, supra, held that 
it was prejudicial error to give an instruction on the last 
clear chance doctrine~ "Where the facts do not justify it." 
And the Supreme Court of Washington, in Lubliner 
v. Ruge, supra, reversed a judgment in favor of defendant, 
because one of the instructions stated that the defendant 
had a right to assume certain rights in crossing the inter-
section where the accident occurred. In holding that the 
instruction was incorrect, the court said: 
"This instruction was incorrect from two stand-
points: It relieved the driver of the car of the duty 
to anticipate that the red light might turn against 
him and to so regulate his speed as to be able to 
avoid entering the intersection against it, and it cast 
upon the appellant the duty to look for the approach 
of the car and to give it the right of way even thougp 
he had the green light in his favor when he entered 
the intersection." · 
And in the Montana case, Garrison v. Trowbridge, 
177 P. 2d. 464, at page 467, the Court said: 
"Furthermore, the court erred in giving instruc-
tion No. 15 reading: 'You are instructed that all traf-
fic, including pedestarians, must, when they approach 
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an intersection of a city street in the City of Great 
Falls, and Scond .A.venue North, the same being a 
through street; stop and look before entering such 
intersection for the purpose of crossing the avenue.' 
To the giving of that instruction plaintiff objected 
upon the ground 'that there was a complete lack of 
any evidence in the case upon which the giving of 
such an instruction can be predicated.' The objec-
to the instn1ction should have been sustained. There 
\Vas no evidence showing that deceased did not stop 
before entering the intersection. It is not proper to 
give an instruction on an issue concerning which there 
is no evidence. (53 A.m. Jur. 455.) 
In the case of Krupp v. Los Angeles Ry. Corporation, 
the appellate court reversed a judgment in defendant's 
favor and, in so holding, the court said: 
"The prejudice suffered by plaintiffs by the fail-
ure to give such an instruction was emphasized when 
the court in another instruction told the jury that 
plaintiffs could not recover if their injuries were a 
'result of the mutual fault and negligence of the de-
fendant and of the plaintiffs.' The fact that this in-
struction was given in a paragraph dealing with the 
measure of damages does not destroy its effect, for 
the jury is presumed to have heard and heeded all of 
the instructions given by; the court. In their answer 
defendants pleaded contributory negligence but no 
evidence was presented at the trial which gave the 
slightest support to these allegations. The instructons 
concerning the 'mutual fault' of the defendants arid 
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of the plaintiffs should not ha~e been given. Chap-
man v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 85 Cal. App. 69, 74, 
258 P. 1006. 
In Clarke v. Volpa Bros., supra, the appellate court 
of Califol,"'lia, reversed a judgment in favor of the defend-
ant, because the lower couFt had given an instruction to 
the jury that -
..... 
"The plaintiff could not assume, or act or reply 
upon the assumption that he would not be injured by 
defendantl truck or by any other truck passing by 
the place he was, but he was required to keep such 
lookout for the trucks as under similar circumstances 
an ordinary prudent person would have kept for his 
own safety and protection." (Italics supplied). 
In holding that the giving of the foregoing instruction 
was reversible error, the appellat~ court said: 
"There was a conflict in the evidnce as to whe-
ther appellant was in a position of danger. Appellant 
also adduced testimony showing that the truck struck 
him after working hours were over and at a time when 
the advent of a truck was not to be expected. It was 
a question, therefore, for the jury to determine whe-
ther the truck had a right to be wherever plaintiff 
was at the time of the accident and whether their 
rights were 'equal in every respect.'" 
~ 
In the case of Hyrum v. Market St. Ry. Co. et.al., 
supra, the California Court reversed the judgment of the 
lower court for the principal reason that the trial court 
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gave an instn1ction on the question as to whether or not 
the accident was unavoidable, 'vhen there was no evidence 
to support it. In passing on this question, the court said: 
"The trial court instructed the jury that the ver-
dict should be for defendants if the jury believed the 
collision resulted_ from unavoidable accident. There 
was no direct or indirect evidence that the collision 
was the result of an ~able accident. The instruc-
tion, under the facts, was clearly misleading to the 
jury, and the giving of it was error prejudicial to ap-
pellant. Scandalis v. Jenny, 132 Cal. App. 307, 22 P. 
2d. 545. 
The District Court of Appeal in California in the case 
of Gregg v. McDonald, 239 Pac. 373, held that the trial 
court gave an instruction not warranted by the evidence, 
and the court said: 
''We agree with appellant that it was calculated 
to mislead the jurors and to a~fect their conclusion on 
the amount of damages to be awarded by them. We 
are satisfied, therefore, that the giving of it was pre-
judicial error necessitating a reversal of the judgment. 
The n1le deducible from the authorities is this: 'Such 
instructions only should be given as are based upon 
legitimate evidence in the case.' " 
III 
·-... _. •:t< 
The plaintiff contends that the trial court committed 
reversible error, (Assignment of Error No. 5) in giving 
its instn1ction No. 18, (Tr. 27, 28.) This instruction of-
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fends agai;nst the general rule with respect to the form and 
sufficiency of an instruction on contributory .negligence. 
From 45 C. J. 1315, Section 925, we 'iHQte 925, we quote 
the general rule as follows: 
"An instruction on contributory negligence must 
not be misleading, nor confusing, nor inconsistent 
with other instructions given, nor invade the province 
of the jury, nor assume the existence of an unproved 
fact, nor single out and give undue prominence to is-
ues, theories, or evidence." 
We earnestly submit that instruction No. 18 is mani-
festly against the foregoing rule because it is suggestive, 
misleading and confusing. For instance, using the word 
"that" at the beginning of each p:;tragraph is suggestive 
that what is stated in each paragraph is true even though 
there is no evidence in the record to support it. In para-
graph -(a) the language there used could easily mislead 
the jury into believing that an employee of the defendant 
was waving his lantern toward the plaintiff an? that the 
plaintiff should have seen the light from said lantern in 
in time to have stopped before arriving at the track. Yet, 
the evidence clearly showed from the testimony of Mrs. 
Archibald, (Tr. 190) and defendant's witness, Squires, 
( Tr. 322) that the employee did not turn his light in the 
direction from which plaintiff was approaching until after 
plaintiff had applied his brakes, and then it was too late 
to serve any useful purpose. 
Paragraphs (d) and (e) both suggest that plaintiff 
was exceeding the speed lirnit. Yet the evidence in the 
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record shows that he was driving between 45 and 50 miles 
per hour, a legal rate of speed. Plaintiff testified that he 
checked the speed when he passed Officer Reese's car and 
the speedometer read bet~een 4.5 and 50 miles per hour, 
(Tr. 227-228) and Officer Reese testified that plaintiff 
was driving normally. (Tr. 154.) 
The same thing might be said of paragraphs (g) and · 
(h). Paragraph (g) assumes that the train was plainly 
visible to the plaintiff and that he failed to stop within 
10 feet of the track, and paragraph (h) assumes that be-
cause plaintiff did not expect the train to be on the track 
that for that reason he "failed to keep a proper lookout." 
The suggestions and assumptions included in every para-
graph of instruction No. 18, are clearly against the undis-
puted evidence in the case, but by their peculiar phrase-
ology the jury could become confused and misled into 
believing that plaintiff was guilty of violating one or all 
of said paragraphs. 
This instruction informed the jury that in order to find 
the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence they need 
only find that one of the particulars listed in said instruc-
tion was true. It is submitted that there is no evidence 
to support some of the particulars mentioned. For in-
stance, the jury may have been so far confused and misled 
by the instruction that they decided that plaintiff was · 
guilty of negligence under paragraph No. (g). There is 
no manner of determing under which paragraph, if any, 
the jury found plaintiff had violated. But suppose that 
the jury found that plaintiff was gui~ty of negligence under 
paragraph (g), then we submit that there is no evidence 
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in the record to prove that the train was plainly visible to 
the plaintiff in sufficient time for him to h~ve avoided a 
collision by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care. 
IV 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred (As-
signment No. 6) in its refusal to give plaintiff's requested 
instruction No. 1 ( Tr. 40) . 
It is earnestly contended by the appellant that the 
statute, section 77-0-14, as amended, applies particularly 
to public crossings on the main line, but does not afford 
sufficient protection on a seldom used spur track which 
crosses a publi~ highway in a rural or country area, and 
without the benefit of ,urban lights. This track was used 
for switching cars from the main line· across the public 
highway to and from a storage beet pile in the fall of the 
year. The testimony showed that on the night in queston 
it was very dark. (Tr. 155, 187). 
In a factual situation of this kind the courts have uni-
form~y held that the railroad company is bound to exercise 
special precautions to avoid injuries to persons lawfully 
using the highway. It was plaintiff's theory throughout 
the trial of this case, that since the engine, operating in 
reverse, was backing the cars toward the crossing at night 
and after dark, and that there was no automatic lighting 
equipment installed at the crossing to warn the public, 
that it was the duty of the ~efendant, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, to maintain a look-out or give a signal or 
warnng at the crossing to travelers using the highway of 
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the presence or approach of the train of cars toward said 
highway, so that the travelers would be able to stop in 
tune to avoid a collision "·ith said train. 
'Ve therefore submit that under the facts and circum-
stance in this case as 01:1tlined above, it was the duty of the 
trial court to instruct the jury on the common law duty 
of the defendant, as · setforth in plaintiff's requested in-
struction No. 1. And it is earnestly contended that the 
court committed reversal error in its failure and refusal to 
give such instruction. It will be seen that the court's re-
fusal was unqualifiedly made. (Tr. 40). In this connec-
tion, it will also be observed that the trial court was of the 
definite opinion that the defendant's duty was determined 
by the provisions of the statute, and that the common law 
duty_ did not apply to the factual situation as presented 
by the evidence in the case at bar. To show that the trial 
court was of the opinion that the statutory duty only ap-
plied to this case, we quote herein the first sentence of 
Instruction No. 9, as follows: 
c:c:y ou are instructed that where a train crew is 
engaged in a switching movement, such as is involved 
in this case, the laws of Utah do not require the train 
crew to put out flares on a highway when crossing 
such highway at night, nor do they require cars in 
such train to be lighted or carry any lights upon 
-th " em. 
We submit that while the foregoing instruction was 
a correct statement of the rule as provided by the statute 
respecting the duty of the defendant, yet, it. should have 
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been followed by plaintiff's requested instruction No. 1, 
which embodied the comn1on law rule. By giving the 
foregoing instruction and then refusing to give plaintiff's 
requested instruction, it had the effect of instructing the 
jury that no lights on the cars, or lights on the highway 
were required. This effectually precluded plaintiff from 
presenting his theory of the case to the jury as framed 
by his pleadings and the evidence adduced at the trial. 
The common law rule is well stated in 52 C. J. 213, 
Section 1811, with respect to backing cars toward or over 
a public crossing as follows: 
"But the fact that the company is engaged in 
switching does not relieve it from exercising care in 
crossing a public street, and since such acts are espec-
ially dangerous, it is bound to exercise special pre-
cautions to avoid injuries to persons lawfully on or 
approaching the track, particularly where the cross-
ing is infrequently used for switching purposes. 
(Klotz v. Winona, Railroad Company, (Minn.) 71 N. 
W. 257.) It is negligent if it backs its engines or 
trains or runs unattended cars without proper look-
outs, or without proper lights, or other signals or 
warnings, and without taking such other precautions 
for the safety of travelers as the circumstance reason-
ably require. xxx, Such light should be of a kind cal-
culated to attract the attention of travelers at or near 
the crossing, indicating to them the approach of the 
train toward the crossing." (Italics Supplied.) 
And the common law rule is well stated in a note in 
15 A.L.R. 1527, as follows: 
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"Ordinarily it is the duty of a railroad company 
to have after dark a conspicuous light on a forward 
car pushed by a locomotive, on a moving car discon-
nected from the locomotive, or on the tender of a 
locomotive backing without cars, when the car or 
locomotive is passing over a street or highway cross-
ing; and the failure of the company to have a light so 
placed when the car or locomotive is passing over the 
cros~ing is negligence sufficient to hold the company 
liable for a consequent injury to or death of a person 
struck at the crossing while exercising reasonable care 
for his own safety." 
It must be remembered that although defendant's 
brakeman was on the highway; the evidence clearly shows 
that he was flagging only against traffic approaching on 
said highway from the northerly direction. The witness, 
Mrs. Archibald, definitely testified that the man flagging 
her did not tum toward the south until after she heard the 
brakes screeching on plaintiff's car. She thought that was 
what caused the man (the brakeman) to turn toward the 
south side of the track. That was just seconds before 
the impact. (Tr. 190, 190}~). The defndant's witness, 
Squires, testified that he did not see the flagman until after 
plaintiff had applied the brakes and then it was too late. 
And that he did not see any light of any kind before then. 
( Tr. 322, 323). The plaintiff testified that he did not 
see the flagman at all. ( Tr. 233). Thus it definitely 
appears that for some reason the brakeman entirely forgot 
about traffic approaching on the highway from the south. 
He was giving his entire at_tention to the traffic ap-
proaching from the north, until he heard the brakes on 
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plaintiffs car begin to screech, then for the first time he 
turned his attention in the direction from which plaintiff 
was approaching. 
It "'rill therefore be definitely seen that so far as plain-
tiff was concerned there was no flagman on the crossing, 
and the plaintiff, Squires, and Mrs. Archibald all testified 
that they did not hear the train whistle nor did they hear 
the engine bell ringing. ( Tr. 192, 233, 322, 323). Thus, the 
statutory duty to ring the bell and sound the whistle was 
unavailing as a warning to travelers using the highway at 
the time the accident occurred. This was no doubt caused 
by the fact that the engine was lacing away from the high-
way and was too far away to be heard by motorists travel-
ing in either direction on the highway. 
It is therefore submitted that under the facts and 
circumstnaces prevailing at the crossing that the only 
means by which the defendant could convey notice to 
motorists approaching the crossing was by a light or flares. 
As the flagman failed to turn or show his light toward 
cars approaching from the south on said highway; and 
since the defendant had no lights or flares posted upon 
th.e cars or upon the highway at said crossing, it will there-
fore be seen that said crossing was completely in the dark, 
so far as concerned motorists approaching said crossing 
from the south. Thus the defendant utterly failed to give 
any warning of any kind to motorists, including the 
plaintiff, traveling along said highway in a northerly direc-
tion. 
The rule applying to this factual situation is perti-
nently stated in 45 C. J. 951, section 510; 
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'"But in order to be proper for consideration in 
this connection the warning must be sufficiently defi-
nite to infonn hiln of the danger and must be given 
in time fo1· h iln to escape it.~~ ( Italics supplied ) . 
When the trial court refused to give the jury an in-
stnlctiop. on ~e common law rule (plaintiff's requested 
instn1ction No. 1 ) but on the contrary instn1cted the jury 
that it \vas not the duty of defendant to put out flares on 
a highway##~ nor require lights upon the (railroad) cars, 
(first sentence instn1ction No. 9, Tr. 24), the jury was mis-
led into believing that the d~fendanfs duty merely re-
quired ringing the bell and sounding the whistle. In this 
connection it should also be remembered that on the date 
of the accident it \Vas cold enough that car windows would 
be closed, and motorists would not be able to hear the 
bell or the whistle, but they could not fail to see a light 
ahead on the highway. Under these conditions prevailing 
at the time of the accident, it was the duty of the trial 
court to instruct th~ jury with respect to the common law 
duty of the defendant, and the plaintiff and appellant 
therefore submits that it was prejudicial and reversable 
error to refuse to submit to the jury the full duty of the 
defendant with respect to protecting travelers as they ap-
proached said crossing. 
This court in a very early case, English v. Southern 
Pac. Ry. Co., 13 Utah 407, held that the common law duty 
of a railroad company to provide warnings in addition to 
the statutory requirements are necessary if the exigencies 
and circumstances of the case require it. In this respect, 
the court said: 
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" 'The duty may exist outside the statute to pro-
vide flagmen or gates or other adequate warning ap-
pliances, if the situation of the crossing reasonably 
requires that - and of this you are to judge - and it 
depends upon the general rule that the company must 
use its privilege of crossing the streets on its surface 
grade with due and reasonable care for the rights of 
other persons using the highway, with proper care 
and caution on their part., " (Italics Supplied). 
To support the foregoing doctrine this court in the 
English case quoted the following excerpt from Railway 
Co. v. Goetz, 79 Ky. 442: 
" 'It is also held in many of the States (in fact, 
the rule is well-nigh, if not quite universal,) that a 
railroad company, under certain circumstances, will 
not be held free from negligence, even though it may 
have complied literally with the terms of a statute pre-
scribing certain signals to be given, and other pre-
cautions to be take by it, for the safety of the travel-
ing public at crossings.' " 
The facts in that case are similiar to the case at bar, 
as the defendant was engaged in switching cars backwards 
over one of the city streets which traversed the raihoad 
yards in Ogden City. 
A ~4i~g-uri Qass, 1~7 8.lfl/. ggg, ura~ apflea:led: t" tfte 
S:bipreFHs CeaFt of t:Be UBited St:atss aRd r8fl8F~ed iB 248 
Ll,.S 422, 61 I. ed ~g6. In an annotation in 15 A. L. R. 
1528, several cases are annotated, including the case of 
Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., vs. Sharp, 63 Fed. 532, and the 
Court laid down the following rule which we earnestly 
contend applies to the facts in the case at bar: 
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~'Independently of a statute requiring railroad 
co1npanies to ring a bell or sound a whistle at all pub-
lic crossings, a railroad company, in backing a train 
of flat cars over a public crossing after dark, without 
a brakeman or light or other signal on them to warn 
the public of their coming, is guilty of negligence. 
Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sharp (Fed.) supra." 
In the case of John Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 
decided by the United States Supreme Court and reported 
in 91 A.L.R. 1049, the fourth headnote relates to the rail-
roads duty at a public crossing and reflects the opinion 
of the court. The headnote reads as follows : 
''The giving of the statutory signals does not ex-
haust the duty of a railroad company at a highway 
crossing when to its knowledge, there is special dan-
ge-r to the traveler through obstructions on the road-
bed narrowing the field of vision.~~ (Italics Supplied). 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, 
illinois Cent. R. Co., v. Davis, 32 Fed. (2d) 232, had under 
consideration the question whether the statutory or com-
mon law rule was applicable to an accident occurring at 
a railroad crossing outside the city limits. In holding that 
the common law rule applied, the court said: 
"The purpose, as we have said, of this provision 
of the statute, in view of subsections 1 and 2 which 
were enacted at the same time, and which compre-
hensively dealt with crossings outside of cities, was 
to protect those within the city and not those outside 
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it. Even, therefore, if there was a failure to comply 
with this statute, there was on that account no viola-
tion of duty to the decedent. The liability as to him 
was determinable under the law applicable to the 
crossing tvhere the accident occurred - the common 
law.'' (Italics Supplied). 
In the California case of Peri v. Los Angeles Junction 
R y. 137 Pac. ( 2d) 441, at page 444, in respect to the ne-
cessity for the use of lights on a freight train, the court 
said: 
"There were no lights on the train except the 
headlight of the engine, the beam of which was ob-
scured from Guida's view after the engine passed the 
crossing by the buildings on the south side of the 
tracks. The wigwag signal was not operating by 
sounding, lighting or moving, while Guida was ap-
proaching the crossing. There were no flares exhib-
ited, watchman present, or any device to warn of the 
presence of the train moving on the crossing other 
than above mentioned.~' (Italics Supplied). 
In Chespeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Folkes, 18 S. E. 2d. 
309, the Supreme court of Virginia said: 
"It is well settled that aside from statutory re-
quirements, a railroad is under a common law duty to 
warn motorists of the approach of a train at a cross-
ing. A railroad is likewise under a similar duty to 
warn motorists of the proximity of a backing train. 
(citing southern Railway Co. v. Campbell, 1 S. E. 
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255). The evidence adduced by plaintiff here to the 
effect that the backing train had no lights, gave no 
signal, and that the brakeman flagged the automobile 
after it had stopped on the tracks and after it was too 
late for ~Ir. Entwisle to get out of the path of the 
approaching box cars is sufficient to spell negligence 
on the part of the defendant." 
We submit that the foregoing factual situation is al-
most identical with the facts· in the case at bar. 
The following cases were cited in the note in 15 A. L. 
R. 1527, supra, and they follow the rule therein stated: 
''In Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Terrell 
(Ind.) 95 N. E. 1109, it was held to be negligence 
at common law for a railroad company to fail to give 
any signals by whistle or bell, or by having a light 
on the forward car~ while its train was backing in the 
dark and over a crossing.='=' (Italics Supplied). 
"In Di Grazio v. Pennsylvania R. Co. ( 1918) 261 
Pa. 364, 104 Atl. 596, an action for the wrongful death 
of the plaintiffs husband, it was held that there was 
a case for the jury; it appearing that he was struck 
at a street crossing in the nighttime by a car pushed 
by a locomotive moving at the rate of 15 miles per 
hour, and there was no light on the car, and no bell 
rung or other warning given of the approach of the 
train." 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reason that the trial Court committed error 
as hereinbefore set forth, plaintiff respectfully submits that 
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
plaintiff should be awarded a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. NELSON, 
SAMUEL J. CARTER, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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